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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff to obtain ajudgment 
regarding property, compelling Defendants to accept a tender of 
performance and to deliver to Plaintiff a deed to said property 
together with a Title Insurance Policy. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court found that Plaintiff made a sufficient 
and proper tender of money owed Defendants, and entered Judgment 
against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants in the amount of 
$2,757.50. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants request this Court reverse the finding of the 
District Court that Plaintiff made a sufficient and proper 
tender. Appellants also request that this case be remanded 
and that Judgment be re-entered for the Defendants for damages 
awarded as agreed to by Stipulation between the parties; or in 
the event that this Court finds such Stipulation to be void as 
a matter of law, that Defendants be allowed to foreclose upon 
the property which is the subject of this action, or to avoid 
the Trial as to Mrs. Bowen as she did not sign the Stipulation, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 7, 1972, Jay E. Bowen and Frances D. 
Bowen, his wife, were record owners of the property which is the 
subject of this law suit. On the above date they entered into 
a Uniform Real Estate Contract selling said property to ' 
American National Mortgage, Inc. An Addendum to the contract was 
drawn, setting out covenants to be performed prior to delivery 
of the deed. 
On August 16, 1973, a Notice of Delinquency dated 
August 13, 1973 was duly served on Buyer, alleging non-performance 
of specific duties. Demand for payment of the balance due was 
made, said balance being past due as of June 1, 1973. Demand 
also was made for specific performance of duties agreed to by 
Buyer in the Addendum, together with attorney's fees and costs. 
On September 21, 1973, Buyer was duly served with a 
Declaration of Forfeiture and Notice to Quit dated September 10, 1973, 
( 
demanding Buyer to vacate and surrender possession of the property 
within five days after service. 
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Buyers response was to file suit, claiming compliance 
with the contract, and alleging non-compliance by Seller. Buyer 
sought, inter alia, an ajudication as to respective rights of Buyer 
and Seller, a preliminary injunction preventing foreclosure, and 
damages. A counterclaim and answer thereto was filed. 
On December 3, 1975, the parties entered into a 
Stipulation as to damages based on the findings that the Court might 
make, and the matter came on to be heard on December 4, 1975, with 




BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE, THE LOWER COURT WAS 
IN ERROR IN ITS FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF MADE 
A PROPER AND SUFFICIENT TENDER. 
In its Findings of Fact, the District Court found: 
6. That on June 5, 1973, Plaintiff met Defendant 
on the property in question and tendered him the 
full amount due under the contract, which amount was 
Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars and 
Fifty Cents ($2,757.50) which amount represented 
Three Thousand Dollars minus an amount equal to the 
value of the cars, which Defendant purchased back from 
Plaintiff pursuant to the addendum in the contract. 
7. That thereafter, on June 13, 1973 Plaintiff 
paid to Security Title Company the amount of 
Twenty Four Hundred Fifty Dollars ($2,450.00). 
Under Conclusions of Law the Court stated: "1. That the Plaintiff 
made Defendant a sufficient and proper tender on June 5, 1973." 
Under the Addendum to the contract the Plaintiff had agreed to 
pay Defendants the balance owing of $3,000.00 less $2.50 for 
each junk automobile repurchased by Defendants. This balance 
was to be paid by June 1, 1973. By actual count, 85 cars remained 
on the premises, to be relocated to a more convenient site 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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on the property by Plaintiff in order to facilitate removal 
by Defendant. 
The Lower Court's Finding of Fact, paragraph six supra, 
based on Plaintiff's unsubstantiated testimony in Court is 
clearly in error. The evidence indicates that the Defendants 
sought to obtain the balance due by employing counsel. If, 
as the Lower Court found, Plaintiff made a sufficient and proper 
tender on June 5, 1973, it would have been redundant for 
Defendants to seek the aid of counsel in recovering monies 
past due shortly thereafter. In Defendants' Notice of 
Delinquency to Plaintiff, dated August 13, 1973, paragraph two, 
the sum of $2,787.50 past due was set forth ($3,000.00 less 
85 cars at $2.50 each). 
It is also unusual that the Plaintiff would, after 
having his tender rejected as the Court found, place a less than 
full and proper amount into escrow about one week later, 
Defendants' very demand for the money by Notice of Delinquency 
rebuts the finding that Plaintiff made a proper and sufficient 
oral tender on June 5, 1973 as the Court found. 
In order for the Lower Court's Conclusion of Law 
paragraph one supra to be correct, the Court must show that 
the full amount was "tendered" on June 5, 1973. The definition 
of "tender" is a definite offer to pay on the one hand and an 
"unqualified refusal" to accept on the other. Supreme Tent, 
Knights of Maccabees of the World v. Fisher, 90 E.E. 1044, 45 Ind 
App 419. There is no evidence of Defendants refusing to 
accept an oral offer of money, moreover, their eagerness to 
obtain the balance due is evidencedby the Notice of Delinauencv 
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sent to Plaintiff. 
Evidence also indicates (Notice of Delinquency), that 
12 to 14 cars remained on the property, which Defendants were 
unable to remove due to a condition which existed due to 
non-performance of the Plaintiff. Under the contract Defendants 
had no obligation to pay for that which they had not received, 
thereby hypothetically Defendant could have rightfully rejected 
a tender of $3,000.00 less 85 x $2.50 if such tender had been 
made. The Defendants had in fact been able to remove only 
about 71 or so of the cars. 
In short, the facts tend more to indicate that a tender 
of the full amount due was probably never made, and the Court 
was in error in finding such tender. 
POINT II. 
THE AMOUNT PAID INTO ESCROW BY PLAINTIFF ON JUNE 
13, 1974 WAS INSUFFICIENT AND NOT A VALID TENDER 
THEREBY PLACING PLAINTIFF IN BREACH AND REPUDI-
ATING AND CONTROVERTING PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY 
OF A FULL TENDER ON JUNE 5. 
The Court in its Conclusions of Law makes no finding 
as to the sum of $2,450.00 paid into escrow by the Plaintiff. 
However, the Court does find: "3. That Security Title Company 
was a contemplated place at which Plaintiff could make tender." 
This finding seems moot in that the Court found that the amount 
owed Defendant was $2,750.00. This amount the Court found 
Plaintiff orally offered to the Defendants on June 5, 1973. The 
Court should have found upon the evidence that the sum 
placed into escrow was the only tender made to the Defendants and 
that it was invalid. 
Plaintiff reveals substantial inconsistency by his Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plea of tender to a higher amount and his placing of a 
substantiated but lesser amount into escrow. Plaintiff's plea 
of tender of $2,750.50 on June 5, 1973 is an admission of 
liability, therefore the placing of a lesser amount into escrow 
at a later date was insufficient and a breach of the contract. 
Plaintifffs excuse for the lesser amount actually 
paid into escrow is that Defendants agreed to pay a survey 
charge. There is no evidence of this and the Court found none. 
A tender upon a condition for which there is no foundation in 
the contract is insufficient. A tender must be without conditions 
to which the creditor can have a valid objection or which will 
be prejudicial to his rights. See Bohler v. Calloway, 267 U.S. 
479, 696 L. Ed 745, 45 S. Ct 431; Bellamah v. Schnider, 68 N.M. 
247, 360 P2d 656. Also a tender must be unconditional. If 
the party who tenders money adds a condition that the party 
who receives shall acknowledge no more is due, it will invalidate 
the tender. Thompkins v. Batie, 7 NW 747, 11 Neb 147; Shiland v. 
Loeb, 69 NYS 11, 12 58 App Div 565. 
Also it is the duty of the debtor to make sure his 
tender is sufficient in amount. He acts at his peril 
and must see to it that his tender is sufficient in amount and 
any delinquency in amount is at his peril. Wood v. Howland, 
127 Iowa 394, 101 NW 756; Greenwade v. Williams (Ky), 281 SW 
2d 707. A tender must include everything to which the creditor 
is entitled, a tender of anything less is not a tender at all. 
Colby v. Reed, 99 U.S. 560, 25 L. Ed. 484; Duke v. Pugh, 218 N.C. 
580, 11 SE 2d 868, 869; Bembridge v. Miller, 235 Ar 396, 385 P2d 1 
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POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE 
STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIES, 
THEREBY ENTERING A JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT WHICH 
WAS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH SAID STIPULATION. 
The Stipulation sets forth the specific issues to 
be tried by the Court. Paragraph one reads: 
1. Whether or not Brown made an offer for 
full tender, either written or oral on or 
before the date due. ( Emphasis added). 
The Stipulation sets forth several issues to be tried regarding 
a specific "purported tender." This "purported tender" is the 
act of placing $2,450.00 into escrow by the Plaintiff on 
June 13, 1973 and is identified as such by the incorporation 
by reference of the Notice of Delinquency dated August 13, 1973. 
Paragraph seven of the Stipulation in part reads: 
7. The following facts are, for the purpose 
of Trial, stipulated: 
a. That the first objection to the 
purported tender was made, was 
August 13, 1973. (Emphasis added). 
Paragraph two of Defendant's Notice of Delinquency dated August 
13, 1973 reads in part: 
. . . American National Mortgage has placed 
$2,450.00 in escrow with Security Title 
Company. This amount is insufficient in 
light of the figures quoted. 
Paragraph seven (d) of the Stipulation reads: 
In the event that the Court finds the purported 
tender insufficient and the tenderer thereby 
liable for breach, the parties hereby stipulate 
to Judgment in the amount of $4,750.00 inclusive 
of all costs, attorney's fees, etc. Judgment 
however will not be entered for at least one (1) 
month ater trial. (Emphasis added) 
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It is clear that paragraph eight of the Stipulation refers to 
the purported tender as it stipulated the amount of $2,450.00 
owing if the Court finds the tender sufficient, or the amount 
of $2,750.00 if the Court finds that Defendants waive their 
objections as to sufficiency. The Court never made any finding 
as to the sufficiency or waiving of objections of the 
purported tender. 
The Court below was in error in finding that Plaintiff 
made a sufficient and proper tender on June 5, 1973 (Conclusions 
of Law, paragraph one). The parties stipulated that apart from 
the purported tender, findings would only be made as to 
tenders which may have been made on or before June 1, 1973. 
No other tender was contemplated by the parties. All other 
references to tender in the Stipulation refer only to the 
purported tender of depositing money into escrow on June 13, 
1973. In accordance with the Stipulation, paragraph seven(d) 
or seven(e), the Court should have ruled on the validity of 
the purported tender. A "stipulation" is an agreement between 
attorneys respecting the conduct of legal proceedings. 
Dinwiddle v. Syler, 323 SW 2d 548, 551, 230 Ark 405. 
Paragraph four,.Conclusions of Law,states the amount 
owed Defendants. This figure, $2,750.50 exceeds the sum placed 
in escrow and should be constructively read as to mean that 
the $2,450.00 purported tender placed in escrow was insufficient 
and therefore invalid. In view of this, Judgment should have 
been .entered for Defendants in the amount of $4,750.00 as 
stipulated to and not $2,750.00 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff was already in breach of the contract when 
he made a purported tender on June 13, 1973. The insufficiency 
of funds of $2,450.00 paid into escrow compounded the breach 
and gave right to Defendants to terminate said contract and re-enter 
the property. The Court was in error when it found Plaintiff made 
a good and sufficient tender on June 5/ 1973, because the amount 
claimed to have been tendered to the Defendant by the Plaintiff 
was $300.00 more than he deposited which is better evidence 
of the tender that he actually made. The Court should have 
given Judgment in accordance with the Stipulation because the 
Plaintiff did not make a proper or sufficient tender. The 
Court should have granted Judgment in accordance with the 
Stipulation for the larger amount because the amount left at 
Security Title was insufficient in accordance with the 
Stipulation. In the alternative, the Court should set aside 
the Judgment at least as to Mrs. Bowen because she did not 
sign the Stipulation upon which the trial was conducted (although 
if the larger Judgment was entered, she would concur in that 
Judgment). 
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